

Clausewitz's Theory and Hybrid Warfare

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Security and defence policies undergo a great transformation at the turn of 2015. The most important of all these policies are the fact that armies win no more wars and it is high time to ponder a new way out . The assertion of Clausewitz: "warfare is the continuation of politics by other means" is now contradictive as the war has gone far from offering a solution. In the war fields such as Serbia, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq, although localized combats are won and other instruments are used to reach the political means by the superior Western armament in the name of restoring international peace and safety, the target could not be reached. American army despite being defined as the topmost army, could not win the Korean, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. Calculations show that Iraq war cost 10500 Dollars per American citizen. As for the Afghanistan operation, per each El Kaide member, 1.3 billion dollars are spent. The inclusion of Russia in the war, conspired in Syria, becomes the evidence of military hopelessness of the Western powers. Although America wins the military confrontations, they lose the war in the countries whose armies they clear off, that is, America cannot provide the political means. As they are in the countries where they go for imperialist purposes, they are considered as occupants and they are confronted with the extensive resistance movement from the people who have the moral support of defending their own country. Asymmetrical wars have shown that small groups can fight against the super powers with success.

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INTRODUCTION

Has the Clausewitz's theory subsided?

During the last 200 years the principal characteristics concerning the nature of war and war field is under substantial change. First of all battleground Clausewitz considers has gone under considerable change, and besides the air, space, cyber dimensions, particularly after 9/11 infested the whole world. In 1901, according to Mahan and Mackinder, in strategic terms the world lay on two mediums, namely the army and the navy forces. By World War II air force also became a new element of the strategy. During the Cold War the basic elements of military forces were constituted of land, naval and air forces. By 1990s with an increasing effect "media" is incorporated into strategy effort elements. In the 21st. Century, first 'space force' is incorporated into basic elements .By the introduction of space and electromagnetic spectrum (cyber space) strategic world became five dimensional. Besides the efforts of forming Space force, by regarding the cyber space as war zones, for the first time Cyber Command is established in order to implement the assault functions beyond security reasons in the USA Armed Forces.

According to Martin Van Creveld contemporary strategic thinking has changed the world of Clausewitz considerably in such a manner that is out of date and erroneous. We are stepping into an age of war between ethnic and religious groups from now on. In the future, wars will not only take place between the armies, but to a large extent between the groups we name terrorist, guerilla, bandit and hijacker that cannot be attributed officially. These organizations will develop around charismatic individuals rather than classical institutional structures and loyalty based on fanaticism and ideology will come to the forefront rather than professionalism. The low intensity conflicts of the future will change the classical aspect of strategy .

In the book, English General Rupert Smith wrote in 2005 based on his experience in Balkans "Utility of Force" , he admits that military forces no longer succeed the tough political targets and says that political outcomes can only be reached under certain conditions. What Rupert observes, is: wars have turned into interminable, complex fights and confrontations between states and non-state actors generally. According to him while most of non-state actors are trying to

become a state, the strategical force utility of states can be summarized as follows: convince, dissuade, force, and compel. What is done in Korea, Taiwan, Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan is not a political victory; contrarily, by compelling the opposite side, threatening them to remain in the present state or else if they go on further it will cost them a high price, or be destroyed.

As for General Sir Rupert Smith, today's wars are going on among the unmilitary (civilian), that is, the fight of people. The purpose of wielding military force, on the other hand, is to affect the intention of the public. When viewed within this perspective Clausewitz's trio (state, army and public) is still relevant. Even the non-state actors, without a determined structure, to a certain extent are dependent on and in contact with the public. This is because the political directive is required for wielding force. This brings forth the necessity of communication before destroying. Provided that this communication line perceives the demand of the public objectively, military operations in a manner articulated by the support of mass media are actualized and the explanation of the events to affect the public is provided.

The American Military force compels the target country, but cannot succeed in managing the construction of that country, which is the basis for the desired political requirement. To sum it up, USA wins the war, but cannot provide peace and stability. That is, building value and institution is required for this. After the fall of Roman Empire, for Europe to create their own worth and institutions, transforming them into political structures one thousand years went by. Returning to wielding military armament; the main issue is establishing a legal government that the public would consent in order to maintain peace which is the political target of the war imposed on that public.

However, the DNA of each country varies; for instance, in the Middle East, for legality, factors like religion, ethnic structure, local beliefs and authority that will hold the power become a part of the activity. As a result, the government established, returns back to the previous state, whereupon corruption, by abuse of the authority and exploitation and instability persists. That is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, the structuring of institution and value is not accomplished. In brief, military armament may clear off the targets, pressurize the enemy, but domestic, territorial and international conditions set the conclusion.

FUTURE WARS

In conjunction with the Cold War there has been a tremendous change in the perception of war, super powers mutually avoid a direct risk of war. Although it is considered that the massive armament is no longer necessary, many countries are still committed to keeping armies large in numbers. A country can protect its existence only by the war weaponry and equipment that the country's particular human element uses. Every state has a reason of existence specific to itself. To maintain the national presence in safety, the state can only be possible by the presence of an actively armed current force. Our age is a time in which quality versus quantity, war is computerized, and the role of commercial technologies is enhanced for defense. In the future to utilize and defend the ability (space and the like) of war such as communication, knowledge and navigation, it is imminent to cover the space. We are in the age of well-trained units that acquire technological merits, equipped with proper weaponry and equipment.

However, no matter how much technology develops, the primary component of war and the most powerful weapon is always the human factor. Despite this, no armies are adequate

enough solely by themselves and in the past, they had more failures, than their victories. The biggest shortcoming of the American army is: instead of a large number of professionals, according to the system of recruiting soldiers, the army constitutes hired (mercenary) soldiers who are scared to die or to become permanently disabled and who actually do not wish to carry out their career in the army. Indians have never used an independent war force outside their country. The war of Russians in Afghanistan has terminated ingloriously. If Americans had not provided reinforcement the British, they would have been perished in Afghanistan. It came to light that within the last 20 years the European armies are just trash without the strategic transportation, intelligence and space capability of the USA. They had to hire helicopters from Ukraine to go to Africa. During the Libyan intervention, in the Mediterranean, that is in a non-adversary waters, they pulled their warships to repair and they were compelled to pay the cost of war to the USA.

50 million people died during the wars and battles that took place in the 20th. Century, two of which were in the world wars. The deaths caused by fighting took place in Eastern and Southeastern Asia until the midst of 1970s and during the later periods of the Cold War, in The Middle East, Asia and Africa. Until the midst of 1990s Saharan Africa became the most conflicting region of the world while Africa became the continent where 69 out of 187 total armed conflagration in the world occurred between 1946 and 2005. From the end of the Cold War until 2009 365 inland and international fights came about. 113 of the fightings took place in Asia but none of them approached the Asia-Pacific region very much. The Asia-Pacific has been waiting like an unburst fault line with the future potential of becoming the scene of armed conflict. The basic reason for this silence is because China, the USA and Russia that are the super power actors of the Asian-Pacific region have different priorities and necessity of time.

At a glance in the future, China and Japan are on a standby on the brink of a war for a few islands. Three wars are imminent between the USA led coalition forces and Iran, North Korea and China for the next 30 years. The USA missile defense system is essential in the sense of resultant force factor capability. Therefore the maximum armament is observed not in the Middle East as widely anticipated, but in the Northern Asia region. The USA, which designated the Asian-Pacific region as the pivot zone, officially declared that they converted to the Concept of Air-Sea Battle (ASB) for this war in 2011.

According to this concept, the USA, beginning with the South China Sea, the coalition forces in the ordinance of backwardly arranged three subsequent rings employed by ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced submarine and war planes, electronic war and mine ships will vanquish China. The porous war strategy of China: Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) envisages shattering the blockade by shooting the American warships region by region and primarily capturing Taiwan. Not only Japan, but also the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan are on full alert against the nuclear weapon, under the protection of America. North Korea, does not conceal that they target Japan and the USA with the nuclear tests they conduct.

The USA, drained in Iraq and Afghanistan, got trapped by debt, and are not relied on by its allies, is striving to determine the strategy they will follow in the jungle of Asia. The USA will endure huge wars of power and systematic clashes in Eurasia. Therefore, the USA is aware of the necessity of a new planning to shift to war capability of absolute result that extends over a period of time, which so far has become comparatively

very costly. This power will be based on offensive strategy, not on defensive force and force aid will have to be made post-haste dependent on developing military posture. The USA has to find new allies like before and render sufficient reinforcement to support them. The number of people who believe that the last agreement made with Iran will turn them from their real intention is pretty low and with the start of Iranian scenario alarm bells are ringing. European armies are still scroungers on the USA. The main issue of Europe is being unable to exceed nationalism and having difficulty in developing a common vision of security. The remaining armies, including Turkey, on the other hand still sustain the characteristic of being rag bag.

HYBRID WAR

Aware of the fact that they cannot retrieve Crimea, annexed by Russia, the USA set off preparations of wars with special agents in the geography of Russia. With the superiority of technology and soft power the defense budget of the USA has seven folded Russia's and it is in the stage of strategy of attrition. Russia, whose economy is entering into a recession and who cannot prevent the capital outflow, may not sustain a long run fight against the West. However, Russia also has some other advantages. As Russia follows a continental strategy, geographically the territories that it is interested in are far more closer in comparison to the USA. Against the sanctions applied, Russia has the advantage of holding the energy and in the surrounding countries angry Russian minorities dwell. By means of high technological capability, for instance, by cyber attacks, it can give arm to the USA and Europe. In the first Cold War the USA and the Soviets had stated some rules and thus avoided a big war. Now a term without rules is entered.

The wielding of armed forces and the fighting methods of the Western states have also undergone significant changes. By the disappearance of the probability of a great war, the Western states have not given up fighting, but armed conflagration are regularized. Western states in restricted conventional wars started to prefer to stay in the background and rather be an onlooker by finding allies countries, supporting these allies by advisors and small military forces. Thereby, beyond overcoming the personnel shortage, they find the opportunity to keep the death toll at the minimum in encountering the public opinion. The technology developed and the methods used, particularly the preference of the air forces always helped the minimization of the Western loss.

The most important trend emerged in recent years in the field of defense happens to be counter-insurgency movement that took place in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, quantity of studies made in this field intensified so much that the ones who are involved in this business began to be called counter-insurgency mafia. Defense planners are arguing on what sort of balance will be formed between the counter-insurgency and other kinds of manoeuvres in the future and what will be the actual place of this manoeuvres type in the 21st Century. Despite the fact that unconventional war is not approved much, for a long time it keeps being a field of study for the strategists.

To support the insurgent groups in a country or the militia that takes sides with governments and wars with agents employed such as in Syria and Iraq became an inseparable part of the medium of security. The USA, for nearly half a century, aimed to win without taking direct action, by train-equipping one party, but this never helped. The tactical elements of the concept of "hybrid war" where Russia wielded

joint conventional and private warfare in Ukraine are as follows ;

- Covert operations and information warfare,
- Fluctuating spoiling activity techniques,
- Providing the resistance groups advanced conventional weaponry and asymmetrical electronic fighting capability,
- Direct intervention of the Russian troops,

According to the USA European Chief of the Army, Lieut. -Gen. Ben Hodges; as of March 2015 Russia has 12 thousand soldiers in Ukraine and 29 thousand soldiers in the Crimean. At the base of the strategy that Moscow practises underlies: always focusing on a local crisis, camouflaging the role of the Russian troops and exploiting the understanding of human rights principles and the like in a nonsensical manner at the operations .

"Global Trends of 2030" report of The USA intelligence Council denotes that in the future the actors such as insurgent, militia, nonstate armed groups will increasingly multiply . This requires a search of a new strategy concerning how to take these irregular warfare under control. The simple fact is without external backing insurgence and civil war is not executable and this support is obtained from the Western countries, to be more precise: from the USA. Yet, these warfares serve the third parties. In the West, in the base of the failure lies giving less but anticipating more . In the long run, the CIA games yielded very little effect .

According to studies made; CIA's activity to support the civil war, became less effective when the direct backing is not provided to ground war fighters. Therefore, in the future, allocating advisers that will give more reliance, advice and backing to those agents fighting ground wars is urged upon. The other main issue is how "principal agent problem " will be solved. The essence of this problem is: the party that is chosen to back, later pursue not the interest of the backing party, but pursue its own interests. It rather happens when the fighting party with the agency does not get enough responsibility and does not provide enough backing. Even when this backing is sufficient enough, not much should be expected.

The military leaders of the 21st. Century are in need of foundations that acquire the connection between better military strategy and global geography. Currently, concerning the military powers, it is the term old structures collapse, new structures, some permanent others temporary, emerge and race to survive. By the termination of the Cold War as the threat of massive conventional attack directed to Europe vanished, the necessity of transformation of the armed forces of the Cold War times also emerged. It is high time to integrate the future strategies with unconventional, irregular war strategies. The fact is, in the future, states will fight back to nonstate armed groups or they will exploit them. Exploiting these groups will bring forward a variety of responsibilities and without doubt they will become a part of a larger strategy. While these strategies are prepared; interfering in the internal affairs of other states, disregarding their sovereignty and the civil people massacring one another will soon be forgotten.

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